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PREVIEW: “The Dog Told Him to Do It”: Kahler v. Kansas, And the 




Oral argument in Kahler v. Kansas took place October 7, 2019 at 10 
A.M. before the United States Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.1 
Sarah O’Rouke Schrup argued for the Petitioner, James Kraig Kahler.2 
Kansas Solicitor General Toby Cruise argued for the Respondent, the 
State of Kansas.3 Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States 
Elizabeth B. Prelogar, as amicus curiae, argued in support of the 
Respondent.4 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This case directly addresses the issue of whether, under the 
Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution, 
Kansas can restrict a defendant’s use of the insanity defense to only 
allow evidence that he could not form the requisite mens rea, or criminal 
intent, element of the charged crime. This case has significant 
implications because a ruling in favor of Petitioner would likely 
invalidate the current mental disease or defect defense5 in Kansas, 
Montana, Idaho, and Utah.  
 
II.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND  
 
Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to 
death for killing four members of his family in 2009.6 At trial, Petitioner 
did not contest that he had killed his estranged wife, her mother, and his 
two daughters.7 Rather, Petitioner maintained that he was suffering from 
such “overwhelming obsessive compulsions and extreme emotional 
disturbances” that he was dissociating from reality at the time of the 
killings.8 Petitioner claimed that he became detached from reality 
following the deterioration of his marriage.9 
                                                                                                                       
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. Oct. 7, 2019) (No. 18-6135).  
2 Id. 
3 Id.  
4 Id.  
5 For purposes of clarity, “mental disease or defect” will be used interchangeably with 
“insanity defense” when referring to Kansas’, Montana’s, Idaho’s, and Utah’s current approach to 
the introduction of evidence regarding mental disability by a defendant for the purposes of defending 
a criminal charge.  
6 Brief for Petitioner at 11, Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. May 31, 2019) (No. 18-6135); Brief 
for the Respondent at 12, Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. Aug. 2, 2019) (No. 18-6135).  
7 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 11; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 9. 
8 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 6.  
9 Id. at 7; Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 2–3.  
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Prior to trial, both parties employed forensic psychiatrists to 
evaluate Petitioner.10 The forensic psychiatrists for both parties reached 
the same conclusion: Petitioner was suffering from “obsessive 
compulsive personality disorder, major depressive disorder, and 
borderline, paranoid and narcissistic personality tendencies.”11 But, 
Kansas has limited a defendant’s use of evidence of mental illness as a 
defense to a crime to only whether the defendant could form the requisite 
mens rea.12 By doing so Kansas has removed the issue of whether a 
defendant, because of mental illness, may be morally culpable for their 
actions, from the jury.13 Thus, Respondent offered evidence to show 
Petitioner possessed the requisite mental state to find him guilty of the 
murders.14 The jury agreed, and Petitioner was sentenced to death.15 
Subsequently, Petitioner lost his direct appeal to the Kansas Supreme 
Court, albeit under two dissenting opinions.16 
 
II.  ARGUMENTS OF THE PARTIES  
 
A.  Petitioner’s Argument  
 
Petitioner argues that Kansas’ mens rea approach to the insanity 
defense violates both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the 
United States Constitution.17 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment serves to protect “those ‘principle[s] of justice so rooted in 
the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as 
fundamental.’”18 Citing long-standing historical practice, the Petitioner 
asserts that a basic tenet of the insanity defense has been to punish only 
those who are morally culpable for their actions.19 Additionally, 
Petitioner argues the common usage of the insanity defense in American 
legal systems by pointing to the fact that forty-six states, the federal 
judiciary, and the military courts currently allow the affirmative defense 
of insanity.20 In fact, up until 1979, every state had the affirmative 
defense of insanity until Montana became the first state to legislatively 
adopt a new approach.21 History and practice also dictates that punishing 
those who are not morally culpable would have been cruel and unusual at 
                                                                                                                       
10 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 10–11. 
11 Id. at 11.  
12 Id. at 5.  
13 Id. at 41. 
14 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 11–12. 
15 Id. at 11. 
16 State v. Kahler, 410 P.3d 105, 133–134 (Kan. 2018).  
17 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 15–16. 
18 Id. at 16 (citing Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)).  
19 Id. at 17–29.  
20 Id. at 26–27.  
21 Id.  
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the time of the founding, and thus fundamentally violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishment.22 Finally,  
Petitioner maintains that Kansas’s mental disease or defect defense 
framework does not adequately protect severely mentally ill defendants 
because it stigmatizes them with a criminal conviction and potentially 
exposes them to incarceration where medical treatment may be 
inadequate.23  
 
B.  Respondent’s Argument 
 
The substantive portions of Kansas’s argument are threefold: (1) no 
specific insanity defense is so deeply rooted in our nation’s history and 
traditions as to trigger the Fourteenth Amendment’s  Due Process 
protections;24 (2) with regard to criminal law, the States are free to adopt 
their own approach to the insanity defense;25 and (3) the Eighth 
Amendment only prohibits cruel and unusual punishment and does not 
require that the States provide certain affirmative defenses.26 In its Due 
Process argument Kansas concedes that the insanity defense has existed 
for hundreds of years.27 But, the insanity defense has taken on multiple 
forms throughout its existence and jurisdictions are allowed play within 
the joints to determine how they want the defense used in practice.28 
Criminal law has largely been left for the states to decide, therefore, no 
federal constitutional standard should be invoked as long as some form 
the defense is available.29 As for the cruel and unusual punishment 
argument, no case law supports Petitioner’s position that the Eighth 
Amendment requires certain defenses be available to a defendant.30  
 
III. Analysis and Application to Montana 
 
A.  Mental Disease or Defect Defense Structure in Kansas and 
Montana  
 
Except for minor semantic differences, Montana’s mental disease or 
defect defense structure is identical to that of Kansas. Montana, like 
Kansas, has a three-stage integration of the defense: pretrial,31 trial,32 and 
                                                                                                                       
22 Id. at 30–31.  
23 Brief for Petitioner, supra note 6, at 32–36. 
24 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 18. 
25 Id. at 19–40.  
26 Id. at 16.   
27 Id. at 19–21.  
28 Id. at 18–19, 37.  
29 Id. at 38.  
30 Brief for the Respondent, supra note 6, at 48–49. 
31 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3222 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1)(a)(i) (2019).  
32 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3219 (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1)(a)(ii) (2019).  
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sentencing.33 Before trial, the defendant must notify opposing counsel 
that the issue of mental capacity to form the requisite intent will be 
raised.34 During trial, the defendant may only admit evidence of mental 
disease or defect inasmuch as it directly attacks the mens rea element of 
the crime.35 Finally, at sentencing the traditional test for insanity plays 
out and the judge will accept any relevant evidence that might show that 
the defendant was unable to appreciate the criminality of his behavior or 
conform his behavior to the requirements of law.36 The purpose of this 
determination at sentencing has a large impact on the defendant because 
a finding that the defendant neither had the cognitive capacity nor 
volitional control determines whether the defendant is sent to a state 
prison or state mental hospital.37 
 
B.  Potential Issues and Impact   
 
The impact of a ruling in favor of the Petitioner will have 
significant consequences because it could potentially invalidate the 
mental disease or defect scheme in place in Montana since 1979. 
Depending on how broad a ruling, it could either impose a constitutional 
floor for the insanity defense or leave Montana’s current approach in 
limbo until the State’s 2021 legislative session. 
 
Regardless, a favorable ruling for the Petitioner will have to 
reconcile with the Court’s prior precedent. Since Leland v. Oregon,38 the 
Court has been reluctant to impose any sort of constitutional standard on 
the states regarding how they should administer the insanity defense.39 
This becomes problematic for the Petitioner because in order to show 
that what Kansas, Montana, and other states have done to the traditional 
insanity defense is a violation of the Constitution requires a showing that 
the affirmative defense of insanity is “so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”40 In Clark v. 
Arizona, 41 the Court notes that because such a wide and varied array of 
                                                                                                                       
33 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-6625(a)(6) (2019); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1)(a)(iii) 
(2019).  
34 Mont. Code Ann. § 46-14-103 (2019); Andrew King-Ries, Arbitrary and Godlike 
Determinations: Insanity, Neuroscience, and Social Control in Montana, 76 MONT. L. REV. 281, 
293 (2015).   
35 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-101(1)(a)(ii) (2019); King-Ries, supra note 34, 293–94.  
36 MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14-311 (2019); King-Ries, supra note 34, 294.  
37 Stephanie C. Simpson, Note, State v. Cowan: The Consequences of Montana’s 
Abolition of the Insanity Defense, 55 MONT. L. REV. 503, 522–23 (1994); King-Ries, supra note 34, 
294–95.  
38 343 U.S. 790 (1952).  
39 See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 749–53 (2006); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 
536–37 (1968) 
Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 800–01 (1952).  
40 Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 202 (1977)  
41 Clark, 548 U.S. at 752–53 (“With this varied background, it is clear that no particular 
formulation has evolved into a baseline for due process, and that the insanity rule, like the 
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insanity defenses exist in the states it is impossible to say in any 
constitutional sense that the absence of any specific defense is a violation 
of due process. Conversely, one commonality does exist: forty-six states, 
the District of Columbia, the federal system, and military jurisdictions 
have an affirmative defense of insanity, unlike the four states at issue 
here.42 
 
Recently, the Supreme Court has signaled that the constraints put on 
defendants in Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and Utah may be 
unconstitutional. Specifically, critics of the mens rea approach and some 
members of the Court are concerned about a specific type of mentally ill 
defendant: the defendant who acknowledges what they are doing is 
wrong, but who cannot control their actions.43 Dissenting from denial of 
a writ of certiorari in Delling v. Idaho,44 Justice Breyer, joined by Justice 
Ginsburg and Justice Sotomayor, posed a question which he reiterated 
during oral argument in this case.45 The question states that there are two 
defendants, both indisputably insane.46 Defendant one kills a man, 
believing that man to be a dog.47 Defendant two kills a man, because he 
believes a dog was telling him to do it.48 Thus, extending this logic to the 
issue here, why in forty-nine other jurisdictions should a defendant be 
allowed to argue that he was insane in both instances and not held 
criminally responsible, but in Montana, Kansas, Idaho, and Utah the 
defendant could only raise insanity in the first situation? 
 
This line of questioning may indicate that if the Court holds that 
Kansas’s statutory framework for the mental disease and defect defense 
is unconstitutional, not only must a cognitive “right or wrong” test must 
be available, but also a volitional test. This hybrid test has been 
advocated by scholars because it serves to better protect a wider array of 
mentally ill persons from the stigma of criminal convictions and 
incarceration.49  
                                                                                                                       
conceptualization of criminal offenses is substantially open to state choice . . . . There being such 
fodder for reasonable debate about what the cognate legal and medical tests should be, due process 
imposes no single canonical formulation of legal insanity”).   
42 Clark, 548 U.S. at 751–52.  
43 State v. Searcy, 798 P.2d 914, 935 (Idaho 1990) (McDevvit, J., dissenting); State v. 
Cowan, 861 P.2d 884, 894 (Mont. 1993) (Treiweiler, J., joined by Hunt, J., dissenting); Brief for 
Petitioner, supra note 6, at 41; Brief of American Psychiatric Association, American Psychological 
Association, American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law, The Judge David L. Bazelon Center for 
Mental Health Law, and Mental Health America as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 25–31, 
Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. Jun. 6, 2019) (No. 18-6135); Brief of Amicus Curiae 290 Criminal Law and 
Mental Health Law Professors In Support of Petitioner’s Request for Reversal and Remand at 11–
17, Kahler v. Kansas, (U.S. Jun. 6, 2019) (No. 18-6135).  
44 568 U.S. 1038 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
45 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 1, at 38.  
46 Delling, 568 U.S. at 1038.  
47 Id.  
48 Id.  
49 See HERBERT FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL INSANITY 242–44 (1972).  






IV.  CONCLUSION 
 
The Court should find in favor of Petitioner and hold that limiting a 
defendant’s use of the insanity defense to only allow evidence which 
shows that they could not form the proper criminal intent is a violation of 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In turn, this 
ruling will very likely strike down Kansas, Montana, Idaho, and Utah’s 
iteration of the insanity defense.  
  
   
 
